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Ford Hall Forum

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Ford Hall Folks

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VOL. I. No. 7.

February 9, 1913.

Price Ten Cents.

UGHT TO FIGHT FAIR.

I don't believe in dog-fights or cock-fights. Not because they are not interesting to any man with red blood in his veins, but because they demoralize. But the men who do believe in these things believe in fair play. When two dogs are set at each other, they must be two that, so far as measurements and judgment can determine, are pretty evenly matched.

They do not set a cocker spaniel against a great Newfoundland, nor a dachshund against a bulldog; no, each dog must have a fair chance, and the rules of the fight are absolutely impartial. It is a fight for life, and it would be too disgusting, even for brutalized men, if the contestants were manifestly unevenly matched.

But the very thing that we disdain in sport among beasts we exalt and idolize in business among men.

We call it competition. Instead of smashing bones and drawing blood, we break hearts and dwarf souls. Instead of fighting for your life, you have to fight for your living. We don't shoot and stab, not according to rules at least, but the man who loses in the battle of competition must starve and freeze or accept charity.

But that is not so bad; the dog-fighters do no worse than that. The satanic devilishness of our game is that the strong are pitted against the weak, the grasping against the open-hearted, the shrewd against the unsophisticated, the rapacious against the tender-hearted.

Whenever I run across a sensitive, artistic soul, struggling with the brutalities of commercial life, trying to keep the heads of his little family above the economic waters, I instinctively think of some beautifully trained house-dog facing in a fighting-pen some great ugly bulldog trained for fighting.

Men differ in physique, temperament, and ability quite as much as dogs differ in stature, disposition, and strength. When dogs fight for their lives, their masters see to it that they are evenly matched and that the rules

of the game are upheld absolutely. When men are thrust into the arena of competitive industrial and commercial life to fight for their livings, they have to go against their competitors, whoever they are, and every one is so busy fighting his own battles that no one is over-concerned to make sure that the fighting proceeds according to the rules; namely, the laws as to rebates, adulteration, child-labor, sanitary conditions, etc.

We are wonderfully tender-hearted to animals. When shall we be as kind to ourselves?

Henry W. Coleman



NEXT SUNDAY'S SPEAKER.

Stewart Anderson of Springfield, Mass., will talk to us next Sunday, on "As An Immigrant Sees It." These will be first-hand impressions, too, for Anderson was a poor lad when he came to this country, not so very many years ago, and he has risen to a position of influence in his community through his own efforts. He will tell us why America seems a promised land to the stranger from o'erseas—and the degree to which it fulfils its promise.

THE TARIFF AND HUMAN LIFE.

Although cancer in its worst form is declared by many to be incurable, yet there are many reputable physicians who declare that it is curable, and many specifics are announced to stay its ravages. The point to which this paragraph calls attention is that such a specific has been announced in Germany called mesothorium. Positive claims are made for its efficiency, and cases in which its use has actually effected a cure are cited. But the exactions of our tariff system are such that the import duty on a mere teaspoonful of it would amount to \$54,000. A Boston physician lately went to Berlin and bought a small drop of the specific for a local patient, for which he paid \$383, including cost of transportation to this country, and the import duty was \$145.20. The duty on a pound of this specific would, under present tariff schedules, be \$5,227,200. Provided all these statements are true—and there seems to be no good reason to doubt their truth—then common humanity would seem to require two things: one is that tariff duties in matters that concern human life as directly as this specific might concern it ought never to be so nearly prohibitive as the duty here involved seems to be. The other thing is that no remedy, if it will do what is alleged of mesothorium, should be allowed to be held as a private possession. It should, either voluntarily or by force of law, be devoted to the free use, under suitable professional guidance, of afflicted humanity. Let the discoverer or inventor be suitably compensated for his right of discovery, but let him not hold his discovery at rates that forbid the boon of life to so many thousands of sufferers, the majority of whom may be classed as poor people.—Editorial in the Watchman (Baptist).

THE RIGHT AND WRONG OF THE LABOR UNION.

(Address of Father John A. Ryan, at the Ford Hall Meeting, February 2, 1913.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen. I have nothing but the pleasantest recollections of my visit here last year, and I thank you very heartily for the welcome that you have extended to me this evening.

I am to speak on the right and

wrong of the labor union and I shall endeavor to discuss the question from the point of view of morals because the moral judgment and the moral test are the ones by which any institution must in the long run stand or fall.

The first question one ought to ask one's self is whether a social institution is right—whether it is necessary for social welfare or for the welfare of any large section of society. Judged by this basis, a labor union as a social institution is justifiable because it is necessary for the welfare of a large section of the people.

It is the clear right and the duty of the wage earner to protect his ability to maintain a home. To this end he may make use of all legitimate means; he may combine with others to enforce this right and form a union with his fellow workers to exert adequate moral power to maintain it and better his condition within the limits of justification. To deny him this right to organize is a direct injustice. He has no other way to safeguard his interests. The rich and the powerful have many ways which they do not hesitate to employ to protect their investment. The working man has only the support of possible combination.

If there were not a single combination of capital in existence, if there was not a single trust or monopoly the labor union would still be necessary for the simple reason that the individual laborer is not the match for the individual employer.

In bargaining power the employer ordinarily has a great advantage. He has a certain amount of economic resources which he can fall back upon which enables him to wait until the laborer is more willing to come to his terms and after all the bargaining scale is chiefly that of the ability to wait until the other man accepts your terms or at least is more willing to accept them.

As his Eminence Cardinal O'Connell has recently pointed out the employers have other means to advocate their rights which they do not hesitate to use. They do not have to make a bargain today or starve; sometimes labor has to do that. That is the cause for the labor union then: the inequality of the individual laborer and the individual employer in bargaining power. That brings us to the utility of the labor union.

I haven't the time to go into any extended discussion of what has been

accomplished by the union but briefly to show

In the first has succeeded in large sections I do not say I all of them—I but it has better employees as to tions of the deed, among but not exclus workers who h this matter by to be the build ing trades, the the women very working trades, in Chicago. T but these are t one can deny th increase in the of workers can their organization the coal miners the benefits in tended not mer also to the unsl in the matter of wise been a gre tions of the wo tivities of the un ditions of emplo

The unions members, too, in denial for the l Even a strike do that sort; it does to subordinate h the sake of the And the unions work in that li also taught them of real democrac ment. Every uni cessful has been cause the membe discipline, have l dinate their pri passions to the i authority of the authority was r have also done a cating public sent the public to liste ple and to hear understand that class is made up that they are no human beings diff other human be men and women claims to recogn women of other

accomplished for the laboring people by the union but I will undertake very briefly to show a few points.

In the first place, the labor union has succeeded in raising the wages for large sections of the laboring people. I do not say it has raised wages for all of them—I do not think it has—but it has bettered conditions of the employees as to wages, over large sections of the field of labor chiefly, indeed, among the skilled workers but not exclusively. The kinds of workers who have been benefited in this matter by the union may be said to be the building trades, the printing trades, the coal miners and among the women very recently the garment working trades, both in New York and in Chicago. There are many others but these are the principal ones. No one can deny that a very considerable increase in the wages of these classes of workers can be traced directly to their organizations and in the case of the coal miners and garment workers, the benefits in this matter have extended not merely to the skilled but also to the unskilled workers. Then, in the matter of hours there has likewise been a great gain for large sections of the workers through the activities of the union; and in other conditions of employment also.

The unions have educated their members, too, in the practice of self denial for the benefit of their class. Even a strike does teach something of that sort; it does teach the individual to subordinate his present desires for the sake of the welfare of the mass. And the unions have done a great work in that line. The unions have also taught their members something of real democracy and of self government. Every union that has been successful has been successful largely because the members have been taught discipline, have been taught to subordinate their private and individual passions to the mass and to obey the authority of the unions wherever that authority was needed. The unions have also done a great work in educating public sentiment, in compelling the public to listen to the working people and to hear their grievances, to understand that all of the working class is made up of human beings and that they are not a separate kind of human beings differing radically from other human beings; that they are *men* and *women* who have the same claims to recognition that men and women of other classes have.

If you will briefly use your historical imagination and ask yourself "what was the status of the laboring person or laborer in society 300 or 400 years ago and even 100 years ago?" and compare that status with the status of the laborer today, you will realize something of what I mean. We might as well be honest with ourselves and admit that we who belong to the comfortable class do somehow look down more or less upon the laborer as belonging to an inferior class. We would not admit that but unconsciously we do it. (Applause.) And if there is less of that done by the average person in the comfortable class today, than there was 100 or 200 years ago, the reason is largely because of the power which labor has exercised through the unions in compelling people to consider them and their grievances; because we always respect power even if we do not respect anything else.

Now no one makes any serious objection to what I have been saying up to this point. The real cause of disagreement as to the labor union, its merits and demerits, is to be found in the methods of the union. Not in the union as an institution; not in the main things for what it stands; not in its achievements but in its methods.

There are several leading methods or practises which almost every labor union advocates and clings tenaciously to. The first of these is the method of collective bargaining and that, of course, is the one about which there is little discussion or disagreement. The union stands essentially for collective bargaining; that is to say for the bargain between the members of the union as a group and the employer or several employers in the trade. It insists that all employers in a given trade, say in coal mining, shall come together and meet the representatives of all the laborers in that employment and that they shall form an agreement as to wages and hours and other conditions of employment which will apply throughout the trade; to every worker in the trade. The bargain is made by collective means; that is a collection of individuals on either side acting as one person. That is the primary method of the labor union, and against that there can be no valid arguments raised. The employer who refuses to treat with his working people as a group or to treat with their representatives is occupy-

ing an indefensible position. But this is a general statement and like all such statements, it is subject to exception of one sort or another. For example:

When the members of a union deliberately and formally proclaim that they do not intend to abide by any agreement that they make except and so long as it shall seem useful to them to do it, then I think the employer is perfectly justified in refusing to deal with that union because there is no reason why he should. Why should he make an agreement with a body of men or women who tell him beforehand that they do not intend to keep their part of the agreement except so long and in so far as they think it is worth while? That is one of the cases in which an employer is perfectly justified in refusing to deal with the union. But as a general thing I say that the employer who takes the position that he will not deal with the representatives of a union but will deal with union members individually occupies an indefensible position for the simple reason that he is trying to prevent his employees from having that source of strength which is necessary in order that they may occupy something like an equal basis or an equally advantageous position in bargaining power with him. Passing from the method of collective bargaining to the method of the closed shop, we come to a device or practise about which there is very much disagreement, and here as elsewhere, I mean to discuss the matter from the viewpoint of morals, right and wrong.

The closed shop as I presume you all know—or the union shop—means that condition in which all of the employees of an establishment—say a factory or store or a railroad—belong to a union, in which no one is permitted to work who does not belong to the union. That is the closed shop. That is to say, it is closed to every one except members of the union—the union people themselves prefer to call it the shop.

That device, that situation, is denounced by people who are friendly otherwise to union labor is denounced on the ground that it is an infringement of the constitutional rights of the individual. A non-union man has a right to work without joining a union if he so chooses and that when any body of men form a labor union and say to a man that he shall not work in this place

unless you belong to the union," that that is a violation of his constitutional rights of liberty and action. Constitutional rights have nothing at all to do with this situation. But if it is true that the non-union man has a right to work in a given establishment without joining the union, it ought to be likewise true that the union man has a right not to work in that establishment so long as the non-union man works beside him. (Applause.) So if the matter is to be put into this phraseology of rights the honors are about equal.

The reasonable way to look at the matter is, however, to inquire whether this condition of joining the union, which the union people put up to the non-union man as a condition or permitting him to work in this shop—whether it is, all things considered, a reasonable condition to impose upon the non-union worker. I think sometimes it is not a reasonable condition. But a great deal of the time I think it is reasonable because there are some other very good reasons why the union people insist upon this union shop situation. In the first place, they say, if union men and non-union men work side by side the employer very often takes advantage of that in order to gradually supplant his union employees with non-union people until, after a time, the shop becomes instead of an open shop a closed shop to the members of the union. (Applause.) That is one of the arguments and I presume that is verified in a great many cases. I do not suppose it is in all. Another argument that they use is that the non-union workers are really enjoying the benefits of organization, when they are employed in a shop in which union conditions are established:—union rates of wages, union conditions as to hours and the rest. They say here we have a group of persons who are getting just the same benefits of the union as the members themselves are and that these men, in all fairness, ought to be compelled to pay for these benefits by becoming members of the union. And of course there is a great deal to be said in favor of that. There are some other arguments which the union people use in order to advocate these closed shops but these, I think, are the two principal ones.

Suppose for example that for one reason or another, an employer does not want to maintain a union shop but says "I am willing to enforce and

maintain union conditions in the establishment and pay the union rates of wages and comply with the conditions of a union shop but I do not want to be put in the attitude of compelling anybody to join the union." He says to the union men, "If you get the non-union men—all right to join your union, all right to be quite willing but I do not want to put it to a man as his condition of employment that he join the union." I think it is a perfectly legitimate attitude and if the employer is to put it out honestly, I do not see how it can reasonably be required of the non-unionist. I say the burden of maintaining the union is upon the non-unionists support the union for the benefits they get rather than upon the employer. The members of the union the rather than upon the employer concerning the rights of the non-unionist I say that, in a great number of cases, it is a reasonable condition to impose to ask him to join the union if he is to get the benefits of the union.

Another practice of the union which there is a great deal of objection to is boycotting. Boycotting in general means the refusal of a group of persons to deal with another individual. That is a very general definition and it is meant to be in order to bring about all kinds of boycott. Now in a boycott is practiced by people of every class of society. When a private society of any kind refuses to admit a member because they do not want to associate with that man who is practicing a boycott in a limited way. They say, we do not want to deal with you on the ground of your common membership in this organization.

When the Priests in the city of Erieck last year advised their parishioners not to patronize certain newspaper dealers who insisted in doing business with a man who was doing disreputable and demoralizing English Sunday newspapers in the city, these Priests were practicing a kind of boycotting or advocating a kind of boycotting so that the boycotting is quite generally practiced throughout society in one form or another.

In the labor world boycotting takes two principal forms, what are called primary and the secondary boycott.

Primary boycott means simply that a number of members of the union refuse to buy goods from a certain establishment. Their friends say that they will buy goods from a certain establishment. For example in the famous Buc

belong to the union," violation of his constitution of liberty and action. Rights have nothing at this situation. But if the non-union man has work in a given establishment joining the union, it is likewise true that the union has a right not to work in an establishment so long as the non-union man works beside him. (Applause.) The matter is to be put on the basis of equality of rights the non-union man has.

Another way to look at the matter is to inquire whether the union has a right of joining the union, or whether the non-union people put up to the union as a condition of permission to work in this shop—all things considered, a condition to impose upon the non-union worker. I think some-thing is a reasonable condition. At all times of the time I think it is because there are some good reasons why the union should join this union shop. At the first place, they say, if the non-union men work for the employer very often, it is of that in order to prevent his union employees from working until, after a while, the shop becomes instead of an open shop a closed shop to the benefit of the union. (Applause.) The result of the arguments and I think is verified in a great many cases. I do not suppose it is an argument that they use to say that non-union workers are not entitled to the benefits of organization if they are employed in a shop where union conditions are maintained. As to union rates of wages, hours and the benefits, they say here we have a union who are getting just what the benefits of the union as the non-union men themselves are and that is a fairness, ought to be paid for these benefits by the non-union members of the union. And there is a great deal to be said for that. There are some arguments which the union people would like to advocate these but these, I think, are the principal ones.

For example that for one thing, if an employer does not maintain a union shop but is unwilling to enforce and

maintain union conditions in my establishment and pay the union scales of wages and comply with all conditions of a union shop but I do not want to be put in the attitude of compelling anybody to join the union." He says to the union men, "If you can get the non-union men—all of them to join your union, all right. I am quite willing but I do not want to put it to a man as his condition of employment that he must join the union." I think that is a perfectly legitimate attitude to take, and if the employer is carrying it out honestly, I do not see how he can reasonably be required to go further. I say the burden of making the non-unionists support the union in return for the benefits they get is upon the members of the union themselves rather than upon the employer. And concerning the rights of the non-unionist I say that, in a great majority of cases, it is a reasonable majority to impose to ask him to join the union if he is to get the benefits of the union.

Another practice of the union about which there is a great deal of discussion is boycotting. Boycotting in general means the refusal of a group of persons to deal with another individual. That is a very general definition; and it is meant to be in order to cover all kinds of boycott. Now in general, a boycott is practiced by people in every class of society. When a club or private society of any kind refuses to admit a member because they do not want to associate with that member it is practicing a boycott in a certain limited way. They say, we do not want to deal with you on the basis of common membership in this organization.

When the Priests in the city of Limerick last year advised their parishioners not to patronize certain newspaper dealers who insisted in importing disreputable and demoralizing English Sunday newspapers over into the city, these Priests were organizing or advocating a kind of boycott, so that the boycott is quite generally practiced throughout society in some form or another.

In the labor world boycott takes two principal forms, what are called the primary and the secondary boycott.

Primary boycott means simply that a number of members of the union and their friends say that they will not buy goods from a certain establishment. For example in the famous Buck Stove

& Range Co. it took the form of a resolve not to purchase stoves made by this firm. There we have what is called primary boycott because it is directed against the primary person who is supposed to be at fault in the quarrel. Now that kind of thing is justified, of course, if the grievance is a real one. It is quite as much justified as a strike. If people have a right to strike and thereby inflict injury upon an employer when he is not doing the fair thing by them they have a right to refuse to buy the things that he produces and inflict injury upon him in that way.

The secondary boycott goes a step further and takes in some third person who refuses to join in the primary or original boycott. For example, in the same Buck Stove & Range case, it took the form of a boycott upon the retail dealers who refused to comply with the demand of the union that they should cease to handle these stoves. Here we have secondary boycott—a boycotting of the person who refuses to co-operate in carrying on the original boycott. Now that is a boycott about which there is a great deal of argument, which is generally denounced and which, so far as I can see, is not morally justified in a great majority of cases. It is expecting too much of the innocent third party to assume that he is going to make your case his own and join with you in the boycott when it means a loss of trade or money or some financial loss to him. So I say secondary boycott may be set down in most cases as not justifiable. I say in most cases. Here again as in the case of every other condition, life is not simple. The situation is not simple, and we have to make allowances for exceptions.

The restriction of output by members of the union is often set down as a great cause of blame to the union. This restriction means that a certain limit of work is set by the union and the members thereof are forbidden to do any more work or turn out any more work than that given number—to lay no more bricks for example. It is assumed by critics of this practice that the practice is altogether wrong. Again, that makes the situation too simple. It all depends on how much restriction is practiced; it all depends on how much is asked of the workers. Over against the evil of restriction of output we have the evil of excessive speeding in the running of the machinery in factories, for example. If

a union restricts the output only so far as it is necessary to prevent the people from being overworked, there is no wrong in it and nothing to be condemned. If in any given shop the machinery is speeded up so as to equal the speed of exceptionally fast workers and to exceed the average speed of the average worker, then the restriction of output is perfectly justifiable because the average worker ought to be required to work only at the average speed, not at the speed that is capable of being reached only by an exceptional worker. Now there is a great deal of that prevailing in our modern industry—a great deal of speeding up. In so far as restriction of output is practiced by the unions as directed against this abuse of fast work, it is, of course, justifiable. If it goes beyond that, if it attempts merely to restrict the amount of the product in order to keep the job going longer, there is, of course, no justification. That is pure and simple dishonesty.

Now, as to the restriction of apprentices—the limiting the number of persons who will be allowed to learn the trade to a certain proportion of say one in ten. I know there is something to be said in favor of this. It is said if too many apprentices are allowed to learn the trade, wages will be reduced and that in self defense, therefore, the members of the union must restrict their number. These are their arguments. But I never can see that that is justifiable. Assuming that this is true, that if an unlimited number of persons is permitted to learn a trade that as a result of this the trade will be relatively overstocked to the extent that wages will be reduced, even if that be true, I maintain that that fact is a far more normal condition than the condition in which you keep up wages by artificially restricting the number of persons in that trade. I try to consider the situation not merely from within the trade but for all the workers who might become members of the trade; and if that trade becomes so popular, as a result of unlimited facilities for allowing the people to learn it,—that as a result wages will be reduced, it means that, compared with other occupations outside of that trade, it is better to be a member of that trade even at the reduced wage. I know that is not the way the labor union people regard this matter, but I think from a viewpoint of the laboring class as a whole it is absolutely reasonable and fair.

I meant to have said something about the use of the injunction in labor disputes but that is rather a large question and I do not think I had better go into it. I will say, however, that I think that most of the grievances of the labor union people in this respect will be removed before a very long time goes by and will be removed by law. In the main I think the people are right in their criticism of the use of the injunction in labor disputes. The injunction is granted largely to prevent boycott; to prevent the enforcement of the closed shop. As in many other judicial decisions, this practice of granting an injunction is a relic of a former age—a relic of the time when strikes were looked upon, when all combinations of working people were looked upon as a conspiracy and therefore forbidden by law; and if the judges who grant injunctions against primary boycott and against the closed shop were logical they would grant injunctions against strikes also. In theory the cases are exactly the same but the reason why injunctions are not granted against strikes now while they are still granted against boycott is that the strike is much older and the judges have come to see that although the primary end of the strike is to injure somebody, it is not the main end. They have come, through actual contact with life, to see that the injury inflicted upon the employer is not the important thing and ultimate thing; that that thing is the benefit which is expected to be gotten by the strikers.

Another thing in methods which causes a great deal of discussion is the strike. The strike itself should be resorted to only when all other methods have failed. The strike should be resorted to likewise only when the grievances which the workers have or the aim which the workers are seeking to attain is a just one. Because there is such a thing as justice in the relation between the employer and the employee. The employee has not the simple right to get all that he can. Sometimes a man gets more than he is entitled to. A strike is also justifiable only when there is some reasonable chance of success. No man is justified to make war on another man, no matter how just is his cause, if he is going to come out of it worse off than he went in. Then during the conduct of a strike, all methods of violence, or physical force should be avoided because they are wrong.

I will admit that you can make out

a pretty good theoretical argument that will have some force in it in favor of the proposition that in some cases the working man has a sort of right to his job. Let me try to formulate such a situation.

Let us suppose that there is a well-established industry in which all the workers have been employed for a long time. They have their homes there and if they are to be thrown out of that employment it means they will not only have to leave that particular kind of work but go into another city. Now here we have a situation in which the working people may be said to have had a sort of right to their jobs. Then a strike is called. In order to break the strike, what are known as strike-breakers are brought in. These are men who do not intend to remain permanently in that employment. They are brought there for the purpose of carrying on the work until the strikers get tired and go back to the work at the old unfair conditions. Now I say in a situation of that sort, you can draw a theoretical argument that will be in favor of the proposition that these striking persons have a right to use violence in order to induce these strike-breakers to stay away from that establishment. (Applause.)

If these strike-breakers are really co-operating with the employer in inflicting an injustice upon the workers—upon the old employees—I think you can make out of the issue a fair theoretical argument in favor of that proposition and it will be a good one,—theoretically,—because you left out of account one of the essential elements in the situation. And that is the fact that there are other parties concerned besides the employer and the strikers and the strike-breakers. There is society in general. Every use of violence in the strike is a violation of social order in that it involves injury not merely to the parties who are concerned but to society and the social order. And for the benefit of social order we must require people with a just grievance of that sort to refrain from the use of violence. We cannot permit it any more than we can permit the members of different families who are at war with each other to work out their quarrels on their own account and with the use of violence. In other words in order to maintain social peace, it is necessary that, no matter how just the cause of the strikers, there should not be any violence used. I am speaking of conditions in this country. (Applause.)

What might happen in other countries where there is less freedom, less possibility of the workers using what power they have politically and otherwise for the correction of their grievances; what might be justified in that country I am not now talking about. I am talking about the situation in this country where things are not as bad as they might be, and where social peace is of primary importance. So I have nothing but condemnation for the whole theory of that form of unionism which is known as Syndicalism. I say there can be, from the viewpoint of morals, nothing but condemnation for that theory of unionism. The men of that organization go even further than nations go when they war with one another. They say that the working class is at war with the capitalist class and that society is backing up the capitalist class, that, therefore, the working class has a right to use weapons which no power at war with another uses in carrying on this fight—that it is right to use these weapons against the capitalist class and against all organization and society and against policemen. Now of course that idea of the situation is entirely false. The syndicalists go further than any political power goes. Political powers admit that if they make an agreement with another power with whom they are at war they must respect that agreement. But the Syndicalist defends every kind of practice and does not admit that he is bound by any agreement made with the capitalist class. That attitude, I say, is not justifiable in any sense or any degree from the viewpoint of the ethics that we know—the Christian ethics. Of course the adventurers of this practice and of this school maintain they have got a brand new kind of ethics. Well, that means that there is not any such thing as truth, and that every man is law unto himself in the matter of conduct. Where is that going to land us?

Of course the remedy of this menace of Syndicalism and the I. W. W. business will be the extreme actions of some members of these organizations. They are not the whole organization and they will provoke a reaction which will destroy their usefulness.

Now just one word which is suggested by this question of violence. With regard to the conviction of the McNamaras and others for dynamiting: From what I have already said, you will conclude naturally that I denounce the practice of dynamiting and all these practices for which these men are convicted. I am not saying

anything about their guilt. I say these practices cannot be justified—of course. That they are not only unjust but that they harm labor in the long run. But in judging the conduct of these men and the conduct of others like them, we ought to try and place the matter in its proper proportions. We ought to try to realize that injustice always breeds injustice; that violence brings on violence. (Applause.) And if we have to point to these men and say that they are guilty of unjustifiable destruction of property on a large scale; on the other side, we ought to point to the capitalist class and say that they have often been guilty of unjustifiable exposure of lives of human beings by refusing to install safety appliances in their works. (Applause.)

For many years the railroads resisted all attempts to require them to use automatic couplers between the cars. Men were being killed and maimed in great numbers for years because these automatic coupling devices were not installed.

I draw a parallel between that kind of practice and the destruction of property by these dynamiters.

The railroads exposed lives to danger and the dynamiters exposed lives to danger.

So I say that we ought to consider this matter in its proper proportion; that violence causes violence—injustice causes injustice—but that two wrongs do not make a right. (Applause.)

A FEW OF THE QUESTIONS.

Q. What is the attitude of the Catholic Church towards the speaker's work—say towards his lecture tonight?

A. I think it would be quite sympathetic. The Catholic priests as a rule are appreciative of what little work I have done in this field. I rarely see any unfavorable criticism.

Q. Do you give any credit for the I. W. W. for the assistance that they rendered in Lawrence. (Applause.)

A. Well I do not know anything about that matter personally, although I have read a great deal about it. I do not know how to answer that. I presume they deserve credit for the spectacular way in which they called the attention of the country at large to certain abuses in that city.

Q. How can a minimum living wage be maintained in the presence of bargain hunters?

A. I do not think a living wage can be established without legislation. I think we are getting somewhat nearer to it gradually; that the field over which the living wage extends is becoming wider, slowly, and that conditions are improving. I think through legislation and the unions, we shall get a living wage sooner than by any other means.

Q. Since Catholicism is supposed to help people and Socialism is for the people, why is Catholicism against Socialism?

A. The gentleman assumes that it is a fact that Socialism is for the people. I don't believe that it is.

Q. How can you say Socialism is not for the people? Who is it for, the capitalists? (Laughter and Applause.)

A. Why, I don't think it is for anybody. (Applause.) It is meant by those who believe in it and advocate it to be for the people. I think it is a great mistake.

Q. Would it be advisable to have unions incorporated and thus made responsible institutions?

A. I think that if our incorporation laws were changed somewhat in order to make it a fairer proposition for them than the present laws are, that would be true. On the other hand, I do not think that the unions have proved themselves irresponsible to such a large extent as to make incorporation a very great necessity.

Q. If the gentleman were a working man, which would he join the A. F. of L. or the I. W. W.

A. I should join the A. F. of L.

Q. In view of the fact that the strike-breaker knows he is injuring the striker in taking his job, hasn't the striker a moral right to injure the strike-breaker?

A. No, for the reason that I gave: that that means a disturbance of public order and injury to the whole of society and that society must be considered as well as the grievances of the individual.

Q. Isn't it wrong for the speaker to speak so depreciatingly of socialism in view of the great strength that it has in Germany.

A. I don't think so. That might simply imply that there are a lot of people in Germany capable of being misled. (Laughter and Applause.) A very large proportion of those who vote the socialistic ticket in Germany do not lean towards socialism at all; they vote the ticket as the only available method of protest against certain abuses. (Applause.)