Document Type
Article
Publication Title
Law, Ethics and Philosophy
Abstract
For generations, philosophers of punishment have sought to revise or combine established theories of punishment in a way that could reconcile the utilitarian aims of punishment with the demands of deontological justice. Victor Tadros’ recent work addresses the same problem, but answers it with an entirely original theory of punishment based on the duties criminals acquire by committing their crimes. The unexpected appearance of a new rationale for punishment has already inspired a robust dialogue between Tadros and his critics on many of the individual claims that, linked together, comprise his argument. This critique focuses instead on Tadros’ theory as a whole and the methodology he uses to support it. It proposes that Tadros’ argumentative strategy can’t justify his rationale by virtue of (1) the extent and complexity of the moral reasoning he invokes, (2) the counter-intuitive results his theory produces in an array of specific cases, and (3) the superiority of a negative-retributivist account in which moral reasoning and intuitive judgments, and the principles and applications that flow from each, are coherent and mutually supportive. Victor Tadros responds to these arguments in an essay following this critique.
First Page
30
Last Page
72
Publication Date
2015
Recommended Citation
Eric Blumenson, The Limits of Moral Argument: Reason and Conviction in Tadros' Philosophy of Punishment, 3 Law, Ethics and Philosophy 30 (2015). Victor Tadros, Response to Blumenson, 3 Law, Ethics and Philosophy 56 (2015).
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License
Comments
Law, Ethics and Philosophy is an open-access journal and complete volumes can be found on their website.